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RECENT CASES
ATTACHMENT-FALURE PROPERLY TO INDEX WRIT AS AFFECTING CONSTnucTmW NoTicE: An attaching creditor levied on the real estate in question by placing the writ in the hands of the sheriff, who in turn filed a
copy of the writ with a description of the property with the county auditor. The auditor however, reversed the indexing of the we'it so that the
debtor's name appeared in the grantee, instead of the grantor column
of the index. About a month later, the debtor sold the same property
to P, a purchaser in good faith without actual notice of the attachment,
who caused his deed to be recorded. After procuring a judgment against
the debtor, the attaching creditor caused an order of sale to issue
against the attached property. The sheriff was proceeding to sell when
P instituted this action for an injunction. The trial court entered judgment enjoining the sale under execution and quieting title in P. Held:
(1) that the attachment was perfected when the sheriff filed a copy
of the writ with 'the county auditor- (2) assuming but not deciding that
the auditor was negligent in indexing the writ, such negligence was not
chargeable to the attaching creditor, nor could it defeat the lien of his
attachment. Judgment reversed. Bates v. Lundy, 78 Wash. Dec. 6, 33 Pac.
(2d) 664 (1934).
There is a sharp conflict of opinion, due in a great measure to the
difference in the statutes of the several jurisdictions as to whether(1) an index is necessary to complete the record of an instrument so
as to make It constructive notice of the existence of such instrument;
(2) -the negligence of the recording officer in failing to properly record
or file the instrument, nullifies the giving of constructive notice to subsequent bona fide purchasers.
1. (a) Indexing hld to be no part of the record: In some jurisdictions, an index although required by statute, is held to be no part of
the record, and to be intended only to furnish facilities for tracing
titles; and where this is the rule, an instrument is properly recorded
when it is correctly transcribed at length, without any other act or
ceremony. Barrett v. Prentiss,57 Vt. 297 (1884) Green v. Garrsngton, 16
Throckmorton v. Price, 28 Tex.
Ohio St. 548, 91 Am. Dec. 103 (1886)
606, 91 Am. Dec. 334 (1866) Bishop v. Schnesder 46 Mo. 472, 2 Am. Rep.
533 (1870)
Chatham v. Bradford, 50 Ga. 327, 15 Am. Rep. 692 (1873)
Co nm'rs v. Babcock, 5 Ore. 472 (1875) Mutual Ltfe Ins. Co. v. Dake, 87
Armstrong v.
Nichol v. Henry, 89 Ind. 54 (1883)
N. Y. 257 (1881)
Jones v. Folks, 149 Va. 140,
Austin, 45 S. C. 69, 29 L. R. A. 772 (1895)
140 S. E. 126 (1927) Scott v. Thomas, 211 Ala. 420, 100 So. 778 (1924)
Seat v. Loussville &
Terrel v. Scott, 129 Okla. 78, 262 Pac. 1071 (1928)
J. County Land Co., 219 Ky. 418, 293 S. W 936 (1927) Ltncoln Bldg. 4
Say. Ass'n. v. Hass, 10 Neb. 581, 7 N. W. 327 (1880) Semon v. Terhune,
Agurs v. Belcher 111 La. 378, 35 So. 607
40 N. J. 361, 2 Atl. 18 (1885)
(1902) Sykes v. Keating, 118 Mass. 517 (1875) Lewiston Steam Mill o.,
v. Foss, 81 Me. 593, 18 Atl. 288 (1889) Butchers' Ice & Supply Co. V.
Bascom, 109 Conn. 433, 146 AtI. 843 (1929) see also 6 C. J. 261, 23 RI. C. L.
190; and annotation in 63 A. L. R. 1058. (b) Indexing held to be essential to constructive notice. In other jurisdictions, including Washington,
provisions requiring an index to be kept, have been construed as making

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
the index essential to the operation of the record as constructive notice.
Barney v. McCarty, 15 Iowa 510, 83 Am. Dec. 427 (1864) Kock v. West,
118 Iowa 468, 92 N. W 663 (1902)
Parry v. Renertson, 208 Iowa 739,
224 N. W 489 (1929) Prouty v. Marshall, 225 Pa. 570, 74 Atl. 550 (1909)
Merchants' & F Bank v. Harrington,193 N. C. 625, 137 S. W 712 (1927)
Ritchie v. Griffiths, I Wash. 429, 25 Pac. 341 (1890)
Congregational
Church Bldg. v. Scandinavian Free Church of Tacoma, 24 Wash. 433, 64
Pae. 750 (1901)
see also, 23 R. C. L. 191, and annotation in 63 A. L. R.
1061. (c) Irrespective however of whether the index is considered essential to complete recording or not, the rule is that it will be sufficient if
enough is disclosed by the index to put an ordinarily prudent examiner
upon inquiry. 1 Jones, Mortgages, 910- 23 R. C. L. 193; 5 Thompson on
Real Property, 152, 153; 41 C. J. 568; Warvelle on Abstracts, 73; Malbon
v. Grow, 15 Wash. 301, 46 Pac. 330 (1896) Jones v. Berg, 105 Wash. 69,
177 Pac. 712 (1919)
Boyer v. Pahvant Mercantile & Inv. Co., 76 Utah 1,
287 Pac. 188 (1930).
2. (a) Grantee, etc., not required to see that instrument is properly
recorded: In -the following cases, it is held that when a grantee, mortgagee, etc., of property has duly deposited the instrument properly executed, with the proper officer for the purpose of having it recorded, he
will be protected against the intervening rights of -third persons even
though the recording officer subsequently fails to record the instrument,
or incorrectly transcribes it. These cases hold that an instrument so
deposited is constructive notice of its contents from the time it is so
deposited. Chapman v. Johnson, 142 Ala. 633, 38 So. 797 (1904) Montague
v. Craddock, 128 Ark. 59, 193 S. W 268 (1917)
Willie v. Hines-Yelton
Lumaber Co., 167 Ga. 883, 146 S. E. 901 (1929) Nattinger v. Ware, 41 Ill.
245 (1866)
T B. Townsend Brick Co. v. Allen, 9 Kan. App. 230, 59 Pac.
683 (1900)
Mangold v. Barlow, 61 Miss. 593, 48 Am. Rep. 84 (1884)
Smith v. Ayden Lumber Co., 144 N. C. 47, 56 S. E. 555 (1907)
Atlas
Lumber Co. v. Canadian-AmericanMortg. Co., 36 N. D. 39, 161 N. W 605
(1917)
Covington v. Fisher 22 Okla. 207, 97 Pac. 615 (1908)
Cleveland
v. Empire Mills, 6 Tex. Civ. App. 479, 25 S. W 1055 (1894)
Knickerbocker Trust Co. v. Penn Cordage Co., 66 N. J. Eq. 305, 58 Atl. 409 (1904)
see also annotation in 70 A. L. R. 595. (b) Grantee, etc., required to see
that instrument is properly recorded: In many states, however, including
Washington, it has been held that the consequences of a failure on the
part of the recording officer properly to record an instrument must be
suffered by the person seeking to protect himself, under the recording
acts, against the intervening rights of third persons. There is little
or no difference in the wording of the statutes under which this and
the opposite view are adopted, the divergence of opinion being a matter of
construction. Where, as in the other cases, the statute provides that
an instrument shall be deemed to be recorded from the time of the
filing thereof for record, it is here construed as intending only that when
such an instrument is properly recorded within a reasonable time thereafter, such recording shall be deemed to have operated as a record from
the itime of filing. Cady v. Purser 131 Cal. 552, 63 Pac. 844 (1901)
Sinclair v. Gunzenhauser 179 Ind. 133, 100 N. E. 376 (1913)
Whalley v.
Small, 25 Iowa 184 (1868)
Opelausas Finance Co. v. Reddell, 9 La. App.
720, 119 So. 770 (1929)
Terrell v. Andrew County, 44 Mo. 309 (1869)
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Gen. Motors Accept. Corp. v. Brackett & S. Co., 84 N. H. 348, 150 Atl. 739
(1930) Frost v. Beekman, 1 Johns. Ch. (N.Y.) 288 (1814)
Jennings v.
Wood, 20 Ohio 261 (1851)
Burns v. Owen, 76 S. C. 481, 57 S. E. 542
(1907) Pringlev. Dunn, 37 Wis. 449, 19 Am. Rep. 772 (1875) Ritchie v.
Griffiths, supra, Congregational Church. Bldg. Soo. v. Scandinavian Free
Church, supra. However, In view of the repeal of sec. 10596 of Rem. Comp.
Stat. which declared that "all deeds, mortgages and assignments of mortgages shall be recorded
and shall be valid as against bona fide purchasers from the date of their filing for record, etc.," (which was substantially the same statute as that in effect when the Ritchie case, supra,
was decided), and the passage of Rem. Rev. Stat. 10596-2 which reads
that "
every such conveyance not so recorded is void as against any
subsequent purchaser in good faith
whose conveyance is first duly
recorded. An instrument is deemed recorded thle minute it is filed for
record," it has been contended that the rule enunciated in the Ritchie
case under this subdivision in the above summary, is no longer the law
by virtue of the present statute. Mr. F C. Hackman in an article entitled
"Changes in Washington Land Title Record Law" which appeared in
2 WAsH. LAw REvIEw 211 (June, 1927) expressed the opinion on page 222
of that article that the new statute did change the rule of the Ritchie
case, for the reason that the whole argument in the Ritchie case was
based upon the statutory obligation of a grantee or mortgagee to give
cons ructive notice of his instrument by recordation thereof in the manner prescribed by law, whereas the new act sets aside that obligation
and establishes a different principle. Thus, between a prior and subsequent bona fide purchaser or mortgagee of the same land from the same
grantor, priority is now determined merely by priority of record, without regard to the fact that the first grantee or mortgagee had not given
constructive notice of his claim at the time the second grantee completed his transaction. Hence the writer concluded that under this new
act, -he grantee or mortgagee does his full duty when he files his
Instrument, and is under no obligation to see that his instrument is
properly indexed or recorded. However, it is submitted that this view
completely overlooks the word "duly" immediately preceding the word
"recorded" in the new statute. "Duly" is ordinarily interpreted to mean
"according to law," i.e. according to the statute governing the subject,
and implies the existence of every fact essential to perfect regularity of
procedure. Reynolds v. Harlem Const. Co., 128 N. Y. S. 642 (1911) O'Donnell v. People, 224 Ill. 218, 79 N. E. 639 (1906) Levy -. Cohen, 92 N. Y. S.
1074 (1905). Unless therefore, the inclusion of this word by the legislature is treated as mere surplusage, it should be given Its ordinary meaning in construing the new statute. (The word "duly" does not appear In
any of the former statutes in Washington). An instrument cannot by any
stretch of the imagination be said to be "duly recorded" if through the
negligence of the auditor, (1) it is not recorded at all, although filed for
record, or (2) either no index at all of the same is made, or is improperly
made, although an index of such instrument is required to be made by
law. Nor does the provision in the same statute that "an snstrument is
deemed recorded the manute it Ts filed for recordi" obviate the rule of
the Ritchie case, since substantially the same provision was present in
the statute under which that case was decided. Hill's Stat. & Codes of
Washington, sec. 1439. This particular phrase as pointed out above means
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nothing more than that when such instrument is properly recorded withrn a reasonable time after it has been filed., such recording shall be
deemed to have operated as a record from the time of filing. This was the
construction placed upon such a provision in the Ritchze case, wherein
the court said on page 439 of the report: "If that view (that legal notice
is given simply by filing the deed with the county auditor and that no
other notice is necessary) could be entertained, it would practically
render the provision in regard to recording a nullity, for the notice
would be complete when the instrument was filed, and no man would
go to the unnecessary expense of recording." The true effect of the
1927 statute upon the rule of the Ritchte case has never been adjudicated
by our supreme court. For all practical purposes and under normal conditions however, it is of little moment which rule Is adopted, for the
injured party can ultimately obtain redress from the recording officer.
The only time the selection of the one rule over the other really becomes
important, is when the action against the recording officer may be
barred by the statute of limitations.
The Washington court in the recent case noted above could very
easily have arrived at the same result they did, by holding that under
our statutes, the county auditor is not required to index writs of attachment. Hence his failure to do so could in no way prejudice the attaching creditor's rights as against subsequent bona fide purchasers. This
is a conclusion which logically follows from a strict construction of the
recording statutes involved. Thus, Rem. Rev. Stat. 10601, which sets out
what instruments the auditor must record, changed the prior law (which
required writs of attachment to be recorded) by entirely omitting any
reference to such writs therein, Rem. Rev. Stat. 659, now provides for
the "filing of" writs of attachment; and Rem. Rev. Stat. 10603, requires
the auditor to index only those instruments "which by law are required
to be recorded." The court however expressly refused to decide or discuss the case on this point. Instead the case is decided upon the theory
that when the attaching creditor procured the writ of attachment to be
placed in the hands of the sheriff, who in turn filed a copy of the writ
with the auditor, that the attachment is at that moment completed, and
nothing the auditor does subsequently in the way of mis-indexing it, can
defeat or impair -the lien. Neither the Ritchie case nor the 1927 statute
(Sec. 10596-2 Rem. Rev. Stat.) were discussed by the court, although
constantly referred to in briefs of counsel. Evidently the court believed
that the filing of writs of attachment were suz generts and outside the
scope of either the rule announced In the Ritchte case or the purview
of the 1927 statute. The brief decision does not reveal the reasoning
of the court very clearly but the conclusion reached can be sustained
without overthrowing the Ritchie rule, by considering the fundamental
differences between the two cases. First of all attachments are writs
or processes of the courts out of which issued. They are issued by the
clerk of the court to the sheriff, who executes them by filing copies
of them with a description of the property attached in the auditor's
office, who indexes them. The clerk, sheriff, and auditor are public officers, performing official duties m respect to attachments. The attaching creditor is under no duty to supervise the performance by those
officers of their respective duties. Thus the attaching creditor is in a
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position different from that of a grantee to a deed, for the filing for
record of a deed is the direct or personal act of the grantee, and becomes his own responsibility. Therefore, all the reasons given in the
Ritchie case for holding a grantee responsible for the filing of his deed
and for supervision of the work of the auditor in effecting recordation,
which includes transcription and indexing, have no application to a
plaintiff procuring the issuance of an attachment.
This case indicates another instance in which our recording statutes
fail to achieve the purpose which was intended, viz, to give constructive
notice of prior liens to subsequent bona fide purchasers. Mere filing without proper indexing cannot possibly put the diligent searcher on notice.
It would seem, as pointed out in the dissenting opinion, that a simple
posting of notice upon the attached premises would be far more effective. This case therefore reveals a deficiency in the recording statute so
far as writs of attachment are concerned, which should be remedied by
the legislature, by requiring that writs of attachment be properly indexed, so that searchers of the record can rely with comparative safety
upon the face of the record.
J. J. L.

CmmINAL LAW-INDICTMENT

AND

INFORmATION-MOTION

To SET ASIDE

JUDGMENT AFTER CONVICTION PLEADING STATUTE OF LimrrAToNs.-Defend-

ant was charged with the crime of rape in an information filed November 30, 1930, which alleged the commission of the offense on March 30,
1926. The California Penal Code, (see. 800) requires that an information must be filed within three years after the commission of a crime,
the defendant not having been absent from the state during that time.
Defendant appeared without counsel, pleaded guilty, and was sentenced
to imprisonment in the state prison. No objection to the information
or any proceeding thereon was urged until March, 1933, when defendant
filed a motion to set aside the judgment on the ground that the court
lacked jurisdiction after the expiration of the three-year period, and
that the judgment was consequently void. The motion was denied and
defendant appealed. Held, that the statute is jurisdictional, that an indictment or information which shows on its face that the prosecution is
barred by limitations fails to state a public offense; and that the point
may be raised att any time before or after judgment. People v. McGee,
36 Pac. (2d) 378 (Cal. 1934).
Prior to this case, the law in California on the question involved was
in a highly confused state. Apparently the point had been previously
decided only twice, and by two conflicting cases. In Exr Parte Blake, 155
Cal. 586, 102 Pac. 269, 18 Ann. Cas. 815 (1909), it was held that the
statute was a mere matter of defense and not a ground for discharge on
habeas corpus. But in People v. Hoffman, 132 Cal. App. 60, 22 Pac. (2d)
229 (1933), on a showing of facts almost identical with those of the
principal case, the court came to -the opposite conclusion, holding that a
motion to set aside a judgment would lie where the information showed
on its face that the statute had run. It is interesting to note that the
court In the Hoffman case, supra, was clearly influenced by the language
of People v. Greene, 74 Cal. 400, 16 Pac. 197, 5 Am. St. Rep. 448 (1887),
which was a civil action wherein it was stated: "It is conceded by all
the authorities that a court will interpose to stay the execution of a
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void judgment. A judgment which is void upon its face and which requires only an inspection of the judgmenivt roll to demonstrate its want
of vitality, is a dead limb upon the judicial tree which should be lopped
off if the power to do so exists." The court in the principal case adopted
the theory that the rule in criminal cases is essentially different from
that governing civil actions, where the Statute of Limitations is a privilege which may be waived, and that, in criminal cases, the State, through
the legislature, has declared that it will not prosecute crimes after the
period has run, and hence has limited the power of the courts to proceed in the matter. In addition to People v. Hoffman, supra, the court
relied on State v. Bilbao, 38 Idaho 92, 213 Pac. 1025, 222 Pac. 785 (1923)
which does not appear to be squarely in point, although it proceeds upon
the theory adopted in the principal case. In the Bilbao case, it was held
that when defendant's demurrer to an information which is defective is
sustained, and where the statutory period expires before a second information is filed, the Statute of Limitations creates a bar to prosecution,
the time within which an offense is committed being a jurisdictional
fa-t. It will be noted that defendant's claim that further prosecution
was barred was raised prior to judgment or conviction.
The point in question appears to have rarely arisen in other jurisdictions. It is squarely raised in Idaho v. Steensland, 33 Idaho 529, 195 Pac.
1080, 13 A.L.R. 1442 (1921). In this case the court stated that the Statute
of Limitations in criminal cases does not offer a privilege which requires
any action on the part of the accused either to accept or reject; that,
on the contrary the State has seen fit -to deprive itself of the right to
prosecute in all cases coming within the terms of the statute; and that
the time within which an offense is committed thus becomes a jurisdictional factor. A.L.R. also cites a conflicting case, wherein it is held that in
criminal cases the Statute of Limitations must be pleaded on the trial
of the case, the court citing the Blake case, supra, with approval. In re
Volney 0. Johnson, 117 Kan. 136, 230 Pac. 67, 37 A.L.R. 1114 (1924).
The problem is briefly touched upon in Wharton's Criminal Procedure,
10th Edition, sec. 367, which apparently defends the theory of the principal case, and states that the construction of a Statute of Limitations should
be liberal to the defendant. A different construction is urged for criminal
cases than for civil suits, because in the former the State is the grantor,
surrendering its right to prosecute and declaring the offense to be no
longer the subject of prosecution. This action of the State is said to
be an act of amnesty declaring that after a certain time, "oblivion shall
be cast over the offense." It is further stated that the defense should
be interposed before conviction and cannot be made subsequently unless
appearing on the indictment. The apparent implication being that in
the latter event, the rule in the principal case should be followed.
A number of cases establish the rule that an information must show
on its face that the crime was committed within the statutory period;
Hunt v.
Ex parte Snydor 222 Mo. App. 798, 10 S.W (2d) 63 (1928)
State, 199 Ind. 550, 159 N.E. 149 (1927)
Carter v. State, 115 Tex. Cr.
App. 614, 27 S.W (2d) 821 (1930)
People v .Anderson, 342 Ill. 290,
and that if it does not do so it is bad on its face
174 N.E. 391 (1931)
and hence void. People v. Rhodes, 308 Ill. 146, 139 N.E. 53 (1923) Alver-
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Stinnett v.
son v. Commonwealth, 196 Ky. 192, 244 S.W 401 (1922)
People v. Weiss, 168
Corntronwealth, 200 Ky. 297, 254 S.W 920 (1923)
Ill. App. 502 (1912). Carrying this line of cases a step further, it appears
that the rules for setting aside a judgment on a void information after
conviction strengthen the view adopted in the principal case. The problem is, of course, distinguishable, the question of waiver not being involved. A group of Georgia cases holds that where an information is
void, the judgment may be arrested upon motion made during the term
at which the verdict was rendered, or the prisoner may be discharged
upon a writ of habeas corpus at any time thereafter if no question as
to the validity of the information was adjudicated at the -trial. It
will be observed that the Georgia courts require a writ of habeas corpus
rather than a motion to vacate and set aside the judgment. See McMoore v. Wheeler 109
Donald v. State, 116 Ga. 536, 55 S.E. 235 (1906)
Ga. 62, 35 S.E. 116 (1900) Griffin v. Eaves, 114 Ga. 65, 39 S.E. 913 (1901)
Claughton,v. State,
Gravitt v. State, 165 Ga. 779, 142 S.E. 100 (1928)
175 S. E. 470 (Ga. 1934). In Oklahoma it has been held that where
judgment has been rendered and -the defendant has suffered the penalty
pronounced m whole or in part, the court can set aside a judgment
void on its face as shown by -the record. Tracy v. State, 24 Okl. Cr. Rep.
144, 216 Pac. 941 (1923).
The rule is apparently established that when the defendant seeks to
have a judgment set aside on the ground that the court lacked jurisdiction, he may do so after conviction; State v. O'Keitlk, 136 Kan. 283, 15
Pac. (2d) 443 (1932) Sawyer v. State, 94 Fla. 60, 113 So. 736 (1927) and
that when the question of jurisdiction is raised the ordinary rule, as
stated in Reeves v. U. S., 35 Fed. (2d) 323 (1929) Hynes v. U. S., 35 Fed.
People v. Schuedter 336 Ill. 244, 168 N.E. 323 (1929),
(2d) 735 (1929)
that a judgment in a criminal case cannot be set aside after sentence
has been satisfied in whole or in part, does not apply.
A search has revealed no Washington case squarely raising the question presented by the principal case. However, it has been held in
State v. Anderson, 109 Wash. 161, 186 Pac. 266 (1919), that a motion
to vacate judgment made after conviction will be granted only upon
a clear showing of a prima facte .defense upon the merits. Accord, State
v. Roberts, 136 Wash. 359, 240 Pac. 3 (1925). See Rem. Rev. Stat. sec. 464,
469. Also -the policy has been adopted that when an application to vacate
a judgment is filed, the judgment, unless absolutely void, is entitled to
every reasonable presumption in its favor, and will not be set aside
except for fraud or irregularity. State v. Scott, 101 Wash. 199, 172 Pac.
C. G. B.
234 (1918).
DA IAGEs-BREACH or AGENcY-BUDEX OF BaooF. A sues P for breach
of contract of agency by which A was given the exclusive right for two
years to sell subscriptions for P's publications through club rates given
newspapers on the Pacific Coast. Under the terms of tle contract A was
obliged to sell the subscriptions at a price such that his commission
-thereon should be at least 25c per subscription, if he sold them at a
higher price he got a higher commission. P breached and terminated
the relationship, giving -the agency to T. The latter sold 27,401 subscriptions to the publications through newspapers during the period
through which A's agency would have extended. Because of the breach
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A was unable to perform a contract for club rates given the Evening
Express of Los Angeles by which contract A would have made 30c per
subscription, and A thereby suffered loss by having to substitute other
magazines. Held. That A was entitled to damagees amounting to 25c
on each subscription sold by T during the period of the exclusive agency
cut off by P's breach less expenses which would have been incurred
during that period, the court citing Sec. 331, Subdivision E of the Restatement of the Law of Contracts to 'the effect that "Proof of the sales
made in the agreed territory
by the principal after the breach, may
be such as to make possible a reasonably accurate estimate of -the commissions that the agent has been prevented from earning." Yaguda v.
Motion Picture Publications Inc., 35 Pac. (2d.) 162 (Cal. App. 1934).
The problem in the instant case is -to find a measure of damages which
will most closely approximate the loss A sustained by reason of P's revocation. 2 C.3. 791. The loss may be said to be comprised of three elements. First, the expense incurred in developing the market should be
considered. Kennedy v. Meilicke Calculator Co., 90 Wash. 238, 155 Pac.
1043 (1916). Second, profits anticipated on contracts to sell between A
and third parties which contracts are entered into but made impossible
of performance by P's revocation should be recovered. (But cf. the instant
case.) Where A is liable on these contracts with third parties the amount
of such liability should be added to A's recovery from P This follows
from the primary rule that damages should include all losses naturally
resulting from the breach of duty. 1 Sutherland on Damages 170. If A
is able to substitute other goods, any profits realized are deductible from
this element of damages; but if a net loss is sustained on such substitution, it should be added to -the recovery. (But cf. the instant case.)
Such net loss should be added although it exceeds the liability which
would have affixed if A had merely refused to perform, provided A did
not betray unreasonably bad business sense in attempting to diminish
loss by substituting other goods. Third, profits on sales for which no
contracts had as yet been entered into but which might have been made
during the period of the agency cut off by the revocation constitute an
element of the loss sustained. This element of loss should include
profits anticipated on A's reasonably prospective contracts to sell. 1
Sutherland on Damages, 259. Further estimate of this element of loss
may be made by a consideration of past sales made by A while carrying
on the agency and of sales made by A's successor during -the period of
agency cut off by the revocation. Wakeman v. Wheeler & W Mfg. Co.,
101 N. Y. 205, 4 N. E. 264, 54 Am. Rep. 676 (1886) Emerson v. Pacific
Coast & N. P Co., 96 Minn. 1, 104 N. W 573, 1 L. R. A. (N. S.) 445 (1905)
Corbzn v. Tausssg, 137 Fed. 151 (1905). But past sales by A are less
relied on because conditions change. Hair v. Barnes, 26 Ill. App. 580
(1887) Roth v. Spero, 48 N. Y. Misc. 506, 96 N. Y. S. 211 (1905). It may
be noted that where an exclusive agency is wrongfully revoked reference
may conveniently be had to subsequent sales by A's successor but that
where a non-exclusive agency is revoked no such reference may feasibly
be made. Thus it appears that an estimate of the sales which A might
have consummated may more easily be made in the case of exclusive
agency than in the case of non-exclusive agency However, in either case
the problem is a vexing one involving future, uncertaan profits. 1 Suther-
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land on Damages 257. It may be added here that where these elements
are not exclusive of each other in a particular case, any overlapping
should be eliminated, otherwise the damages will partake of a punitive
rather than compensatory nature. Spokane Truck & Dray Co. v. Hoefer,
2 Wash. 45, 25 Pac. 1072, 11 L.R.A_ 689 (1891) 1 Mechem on Agency 1165.
The damages as measured above should be diminished by costs which
would have been incurred in undertaking or carrying on the agency and
by any earnings made in employment which could not have been carried on if the agency had continued. If the agency revoked took all or
part of A's time, A is now under a duty to try to find and to accept
other employment, provided that employment is not of a nature drastically different from that which A has done before or from that for which
A is qualified. See 1 Mechem on Agency 1165 and authorities cited. Also
see Nat. Grocery Co. v. A. Santaella d Co., 160 Wash. 262, 295 Pac. 128
(1931). Consider the instant case in the light of the rule here stated;
the court in its opinion makes no mention of the duty adverted to above.
As to burden of proof the best rule is that A must affirmatively prove
all the elements of his loss enumerated above; thus he must prove that
he could have made sales made by his successor. Illsey v. Peerless Motor
Car. Co., 177 Ill. App. 459 (1913) Isern v. Gordon, 127 Kan. 296, 273 Pac.
American Bldg. & Loan Assn. v. Hart and
435, 64 A.L.R. 391 (1929)
Similarly P must prove the
Faxon. 2 Wash. 594, 27 Pac. 468 (1891).
items cutting down on the recovery. Some courts regard A as setting
up a prima facie case where the sales of his successor are shown or he
shows that he had prospective customers, and P must come forward and
prove that A could not have made the sales. Park v. Swartz, 110 Texas
Robertson v. Wilson, 121 Wash. 358, 209 Pac.
564, 222 S. W 156 (1920)
.841 (1922). A similar presumption arises that A has dutifully endeavored
to find other employment. I Mechem on Agency 1166. Finally, many
courts preclude P from controverting A's proof of loss of commissions on
sales made by his successor, the commissions being regarded as liquidated damages in case of breach. Schtffman v. Peerless M. C. Co., 13 Cal.
Caffe v. Newark A. Mfg. Co., 78 N. Y.
App. 600, 110 Pac. 460 (1910)
Gunning v. Muller 118 Wash. 685, 204
Misc. 152, 137 N.Y.S. 906 (1912)
Pac. 779 (1922). A finding of trade usage would strengthen the holding
of these latter courts. Illseit v. Peerless Motor Co., 195 Ill. App. 572
(1915). The instant case apparently follows the rule of preclusion.
The principal case is vulnerable to criticism on a number of points
if the foregoing analysis is correct. But the fault possibly lies more with
the opposing counsel than with the court since the burden is upon them
to prove and to controvert the elements of damages and of set-off. In
general it may be said that the courts have been assiduous in endeavoring
to make damages certain with a success varying directly with the diligence of the opposing counsel in presenting relevant evidence.
L. V L.
ExEcuTors

AND

ADmINISTRATOS-RIGHT

TO APPOINTMENT-TESTAME N-

SELEcTxoN-EFFECT. On March 6, 1931, W executed her last will and
testament, in which she nominated and appointed H, her husband, as
executor- the will further providing that in the event that H should die
or be unable to complete his trust, then the relators herein should act as
the executors under the will. W died on March 6, 1932, and on March 10,
TARY
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1932, her will was admitted to probate upon the petition of her husband,
who thereupon duly qualified as executor. The total community estate
was valued at approximately $800,000 and it soon became apparent that
the burdens of executorship were too great for H. Upon petition of H
and the creditors the respondents were appointed as administrators of
the estate. In September, 1933, a few days before H's death, the relators
learned for the first time of their alternative appointment as executors,
and they thereupon filed a petition seeking the revocation of the letters
of administration granted to the respondents and the appointment of
themselves as executors under the will. Held: That in the absence of
fraud connected with the will or the estate, and in the absence of any
statutory disqualification, the right of the testatrix to appoint an executor
of her will may not be superseded by the court through the appointment
of an administrator in his place, and the relators must, therefore, prevail.
State State ex rel. Lauridsen et al., v. The Superior Court et al., 79 Wash.
Dec. 183, 37 Pac. (2d) 209 (1934).
The decision is undoubtedly correct in view of the facts of the case;
for, although the present administrators were better qualified to handle
the state than the relators would be, yet no fraud was shown nor were
the relators in any way disqualified to act, and the court was thus left
no alternative but to follow the universal rule that a testator may name
the person who shall be the executor of his or her will, and when so
named, letters testamentary shall be issued to such persons unless he be
ineligible. Rem. Rev. Stat., secs. 1415, 1417 and 1457 11 R. C. L. 31,
sec. 17 3 Schouler on Wills (6th Ed.), secs. 1494 and 1539; 1 Bancroft's
Probate Practice, p. 434, sec. 236.
Since the administration of an estate, generally is a proceeding in
rem, Dooly v. Russell, 10 Wash. 195, 38 Pac. 1000 (1895)
Furth v. U. S.
Mortgage and Trust Co., 13 Wash. 73, 42 Pac. 523 (1895)
it is true that,
when the court has once obtained jurisdiction of the res, all presumptions
and intendments are to be taken in favor of the regularity and validity
of its proceedings. As a rule, therefore, an order appointing an administrator is not subject to collateral attack. 11 R. C. L., 74 sec. 71. But in
a direct attack inquiry may be made as to the regularity and validity
of the order of appointment, 11 R. C. L. 86, sec. 84, 3 Schouler on Wills
(6th Ed.), p. 1817, sec. 1650- 23 C. J. 1103; see. 278; 1 Bancroft's Probate
Practice, p. 548, see. 288; for if the court were precluded from a reinvestigation of the facts an impostor might obtain letters of administration,
and, after the period for appeal had elapsed, remain securely in an office
to which he has no right, with no court having power to remove him.
Thus, the conclusion that the order appointing the administrators
should be set aside and the relators appointed as executors is soundly
reached and in accord with the majority of jurisdictions in these cases
where no fraud or disqualification is shown.
A dissenting opinion was given in which four justices concurred, on
the ground that the right of those interested in having an estate administered and distributed in accordance with the law is the dominant right
with the right of a particular person to administer the estate being secondary" and, there, owing to the familiarity of the respondents with the
condition of the estate they were the best qualified to administer upor
it and serve the rights of those interested therein.
R. P
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MEcHANIcs' LIENS.-STATUTE OF LnhuITATIONS ON FILING OF LENs-Com-

Suit was brought by P to foreclose a mechanic's lien upon property of D, P being a subcontractor of C, the builder
of the funeral home in question. When the building was substantially
completed, except for the installation of three elevating doors to the
driveway, an iron railing around the balcony, seven wheel guards along
the driveway, and three ornamental iron grills to cover windows, D moved
in and used the premises for his business. At this point C had ceased
work and departed to seek additional credit to enable him to complete,
but D at no time treated the contract as performed, but on the contrary
sought out C to have him complete at once, $462.25 worth of work remaining. D later ordered some of the materials needed for this completion.
The entire job cost $6800 and only $800 had been paid 'by D to C. D defended on the ground that there was substantial completion at the time
C left town and hence P had filed his lien after the statutory period of
grace had expired. Held: The building was not substantially completed
In view of the conduct of the parties, the facts, and the circumstances
of the case, and furthermore, assuming but not deciding, that abandonment Is equivalent to substantial completion for the purpose of causing
the period for filing to run, there was shown here no abandonment by
C, nor intent on D's part to treat C's conduct as such. Allison v. Schuler,
36 Pac. (2d) 519, (N. M., 1934.)
PLETION AND ABANDONAENT.

The instant case raises two problems in regard to the time of filing
a mechanic's lien; first, as to what the courts will consider substantial
completion so as to start the statute running, and second, assuming abandonment is equivalent to substantial completion, when such abandonment
exists.
New Mexico adopts the general rule that while the time for filing
a mechanic's lien is to be computed from the time when the work is
completed, yet substantial completion is sufficient to start the statute
of limitations running, and just what is substantial completion is always
a question of fact. Genest v. Las Vegas Masonic Bldg. Ass'n., 11 N. M. 251,
67 Pac. 743 (1902) 40 C. J. "Mechanic's Liens," sec. 223.
In Washington, because of the wording of our statute, the difficult
problem of deciding when there has been substantial completion will
not be likely to confront the court, since our statute emphasizes cessation
and does not involve completion or abandonment. Rem. Rev. Stat. sec.
1134, reads in part as follows: "No lien created by this chapter shall
exist and no action to enforce the same shall be maintained unless within
90 days from the date of cessation of the performance of such labor or
the furnishing of such materials a claim shall be filed for record as
hereinafter provided.
" Our problem becomes one of interpreting the
significance of the word cessation, and the cases indicate that this can
be decided without considering the element of substantial completion or
abandonment. However, in determining when there has been a cessation,
or granting there has been such, in determining when the time will run
to the last date of performance because of the good faith in doing additional work, the facts and circumstances must be taken into consideration In each instance. John Dower Lbr Co. v. McCainmon, 141 Wash. 381,
250 Pac. 107 (1926) Osten v. Curtis, 133 Wash. 360, 233 Pac. 643 (1925)
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American Plumnbing d Steam Supply Co. v. Alavektu, 154 Wash. 436, 282
Pac. 917 (1929)
Rieflin v. Grafton, 63 Wash. 387, 115 Pac. 851 (1911)
but see also Jones on Liens, sec. 1444, 'Warming v. Hargis, 159 Wash. 501,
294 Pao. 248 (1930) Gallatinv. Miller 139 Wash. 521, 247 Pac. 936 (1926)
Rose v. O'Reilly, 138 Wash. 18, 244 Pac. 124 (1926) Bradley v. DonovanPetro Paint Mfg.
Pattison Realty Co., 84 Wash. 654, 147 Pac. 421 (1915)
Co. v. Taylor 147 Wash. 158, 265 Pac. 155 (1928).
In determining whether or not abandonment is equivalent to substantial completion in order to start the statute of limitations for filing
of liens running, the states which have statutes similar to those of New
Mexico, have taken different views as to what constitutes abandonment.
Kansas follows the rule that actual cessation of work starts the statute
running and the court there will not inquire as to the reason for the
cessation nor the existence of any secret intention on the owner's part
not to treat the work as abandoned. This view of course, coincides with
the rule in Washington, not because we must find whether there has
been an abandonment but because cessation is the only test we have
to determine when the statute starts to run. But even under the Washington rule, a mechanic's lien will not fail because the work was done at
intervals and not prosecuted diligently, where there was no limitation
by contract, and the last work was not delayed fraudulently, Rose v.
O'Reilly, supra.
The principal case follows a contrary doctrine strongly advocated by
Oregon to the effect that abandonment, to be sufficient to start the statute
of limitations running, must include a cessation of operation and an
intent on the part of the owner and contractor to cease operations perm-anently so as to give fair notice to the lien claimant, either actual or constructive, of the abandonment. It is essential that the intention of the
parties be not a secret one. In the instant case the conduct of the parties,
C's attempt to get further credit and D's attempt to get 0 to finish the
work, Indicated an intent not to abandon. Though in Washington, as
we have seen, intent would hardly be involved in considering whether
or not there was an actual cessation of work, yet intent of the parties
would be Important in determining the presence of the owner's consent
and the contractor's good faith, in performing added services which
incidentally cause the statute of limitations to start running on the last
R. T. Y.
day of the added performance.
TAXATION-EXEMPTION OF PROPERTY OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONSPOWER To TAx. Where a state constitution expressly provides that the
property of municipal corporations shall be exempt from taxation and
defines -property as everything whether tangible or intangible, subject
to ownership, a tax upon the privilege of engaging in certain business
activities, levied upon all persons including municipal corporations in
such activities and measured by the gross income thereof, does not attempt to tax property of municipal corporations which the constitution
declares to be exempt. City of Tacoma v. The State Commission, which
involved an attack upon the state occupation tax. Rem. Rev. Stat. 1933
Sup., sec. 8326-2; 77 Wash. Dec. 484, 33 Pac. (2d), 899 (1934).
The soundness of the holding must rest on one of two grounds; (1)
that the tax under consideration is an excise tax and not a tax on property,
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or (2), that the constitutional exemption does not apply to and exempt
from taxation property owned and used by a municipal corporation in
its proprietary capacity for profit. The exemption provides that "the
property of the United States, and of the state, counties, school districts,
and other municipal corporations shall be exempt from taxation." Art.
VIII sec. 2. Washington Constitution.
The fact that the court said, with reference to the city light plant,
that, "These activities are conducted by respondents in their propriety
capacity, not as governmental agencies" and later said that the tax
"does not attempt to tax property of municipal corporations which the
constitution declares to be exempt" might lead one to believe that the
court was resting its decision on the second ground. This is possible,
but in view of the decisions of other states with similar constitutional
exemptions, it seems improbable.
The courts are almost uniform in holding that if state or municipal
property is expressly exempted by the constitution or a statute, and there
are no qualifyting words used, the property- is exempt regardless of its
use. San Franctsco v. "kGovern, 28 Cal. App. 491, 152 Pac. 980 (1915)
Cooley on Taxation, 4th ed. sec. 638; see also numerous cases cited in
notes in L.R.A. 1915A, 1118; and in 3 A.L.RL 143. Cf. Gassaway v. Seattle,
52 Wash. 444, 100 Pac. 991, 21 L.R.A. (N.S.) 68 (1909). Even where the
exemption is limited to municipal property used for a public purpose,
a municipal light plant is exempt from taxation though it receives a
revenue from its business. Traverse City v. Blair, 190 Mich. 313, 157
N.W 81 (1916) Perth Amboy v. Barker, 74 N.J.L. 127, 65 At. 201 (1906).
The decision must therefore rest on the first ground which is that
the tax being an excise, is not a tax on exempted property. As was
pointed out by the court the tax in question had in a previous case been
held to be an excise and not a property tax. State ex rel Stiner -v. Yeile,
174 Wash. 402, 25 Pac. (2d) 91 (1933). In another case -the same court
held a tax on net income to be a property tax. Cu~liton. 'v. Chase, 174
Wash. 363, 25 Pac. (2d) 81 (1933). It is difficult to harmonize these two
decisions. The theory of the Culliton case is that an income tax Is a
tax on income as such and since income is "property" under our constitutional definition of "property" as "everything whether tangible or intangible subject to ownership," an income tax is a property tax. It has
been urged that the court failed to distinguish between the subject matter of the tax and the method used -to determine its amount. See 8 WAsH.
LAW REVIEw 81. Had the court followed this same theory in its decision
of the Stiner case it seems that they could not have escaped the conclusion that an occupation tax is a tax on gross income, that gross income
is "property" and that the tax is therefore a property tax. However, the
court did not apply -this theory and reached the opposite result, which,
it is submitted, is the preferable one.
Assuming the Stiner case to be correct in theory, there is nevertheless an obstarle confronting its extension to the instant case. Even
though the tax be an excise it would seem that its application to munipal corporations is contrary to the spirit of the constitutional exemption
of municipal property. It must be conceded that the tax places a burden
upon the use of the property. It has been held that the purpose of
classifying certain taxes as direct was to render it impossible to burden
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by taxation accumulations of property except subjeat to the regulation
of apportionment, and that the federal income tax, though by common
understanding an excise tax, was nevertheless direct on property "since
to burden an income by a tax was from the point of substance, to burden
the property from which the income was derived." Brushaber v. Union
Pactfic Railroad, 240 U.S. 1, 60 L.Ed. 493, 36 Sup. Ct. 236, 241 (1916),
interpreting Pollock v. Farmers Loan and Trust Co., 157 U. S. 429, 39
L.Ed. 759, 15 Sup. Ct. 673 (1895).
In spite of this argument the result of the principal case is probably
sound. Beause of the increasing tendency of municipal corporations to
enter into competition with private interests in supplying public utility
services a contrary holding would not only be inequitable in that it would
handicap the private companies in that competition but it would result
In a serious curtailment of the tax sources of the state. See Puget Sound
Power & Light Co. v. Seattle, 172 Wash. 668, 21 Pac. (2d) 727 (1934).
The instant case involves another constitutional problem. The City
of Seattle, as trustees of the holders of the bonds of the municipal light
plant, interpleaded, and objected -to the tax on the ground that it impaired the obligation of a contract between the city and the bondholders.
The entire gross revenues of the light plant were pledged to the payment
of the bonds and such payments could legally be made only out of those
earnings. This objection was based on the theory that the state, by
virtue of the provisions of Rem. Rev. State. sec.s. 9488 et seq authorizing
the aquisition of the utility and the issuance of the bonds, had entered
into an implied contract not to tax the utility The court found that
there was no such contract and applied the rule laid down by Chief
Justice Marshall in Providence Bank v. Billings, 4 Pet. 514, 7 L.Ed. 939
(1830), that the relinquishment of the power to tax shall never be assumed, that exemptions from taxation must be expressed or they do
not exist. Cf. Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge. 11 Pet. 544, 9 L.Ed.
773 (1837) and Chicago Theological Seminary v. Illinois, 188 U. S. 662,
23 Sup. Ct. 386, 47 L.Ed. 641 (1903), which contains a collection of the
cases on this point.
C. S.
WORKMAN'S COMPENSATION-STATUS OF WIDOW WHO MARRIED INJURED
WORKMAN

SUBSEQUENT TO TIME OF INJuRy.

X,

a

workman injured in

a

hazardous occupation, received compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act. Subsequently he married Y and had one child from this
union. X died. Could Y claim compensation as a "widow" under the act?
Held: Y recovered even though she became X's wife subsequent to the
time of X's injury. McKay v. The Department of Labor and Industries,
80 Wash. Dec. 168 (1934).
Rem. Rev. Stat., Section 7679, provides: "Each workman who shall
be injured in the course of his employment, or his family or dependents
in case of death of workman, shall receive out of the accident fund compensation in accordance with the following schedule, and, except as in
this act otherwise provided, such payment shall be in lieu of any and all
rights of action whatsoever against any person whomsoever
"(1) If the workman leaves a widow a monthly payment of $35 shall
be made throughout the life of surviving spouse."
This section also provided that the workman shall receive monthly
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"if unmarried at time of injury, sum of $35." It is clear that the section
quoted does not solve this problem since the workman is dead and the
plaintiff claims here as a widow, a right given her by statute independent
of the injured workman's right to compensation.
Both parties agree that the law in effect at the time of the injury
governs the rights of the parties, but from this premise counsels reach
different conclusions. The Department contends that the relationship
of the parties at the time of the accident also governs their rights to
subsequent compensation, citing Foster v. The Department of Labor and
and
Industries, 161 Wash. 54, 296 Pac. 148, 73 A. L. R. 1012 (1931)
Thorpe v. The Department of Labor and Industries, 145 Wash. 498, 261
Pac. 85 (1927). The widow contends that the law at the time of injury
which governs the rights of the parties has not been changed. The
court distinguishes the case of Foster v. The Department from the instant case as being decided on a different section of the statute (whether
compensation to an injured workman could be increased by his subsequent
marriage) whereas the section in the instant case refers to the compensation to the widow, not the workman. The widow is entitled to recover
for the death of the workman and not for his injury, for which he alone
is entitled to recover, citing Zahier v. The Department of Labor and Industries, 125 Wash. 410, 217 Pac. 55 (1923). The widow's right to compensation does not arise until the workmaa's death, but of course the
widow recovers indirectly from the workman's injury since the widow
has no action unless the workman's injury falls within the statute. The
Thorpe case, holding that the law at the time of injury, and not a law
subsequent thereto, controls the status of a widow, is irrelevant in the
instant case where no change of statute was involed.
New York is in accord with the instant case following their view in
Crockett v. InternationalRailway Co., 176 App. Div., 162 N. Y. S. 357
13 A. L. R. 708 (1916). In that case, in spite of an express provision in a
Workman's Compensation Act that all questions of dependency shall be
determined as of the time of the accident, the court held that a woman
who marries a workman after the injury which subsequently causes his
death is entitled to compensation, as her right to it is based not on her
dependency but on her wifehood.
Statutes in most states expressly provide that dependency as of the
time of accident shall control the rights of the parties so the majority
of courts construing these statutes do reach a result contra to the McKay
case.
In the Washington statute on Workmen's Compensation, there is no
definition of "widow" and no provision that the status of the parties shall
be determined as of the time of the injury. Consequently the court must
resort to statutory construction. The following rule of statutory construction will support the majority decision. Most of the sections refer
to the status of the workman and his family at the time of the injury to
be eligible for compensation; the section under consideration in regard
to the widow does not so provide; hence in the section in regard to
widows, the -legislature did not intend to limit their recovery to their
status at the time of the injury.
In conclusion, the majority of the court, as do many courts to ease
their mind when in doubt as to which decision is proper, states: "The
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plain and unambiguous language of the statute provides the compensation to respondent" (the widow).
There was a vigorous dissenting opinion in the McKay case, but this
dissent, in the last analysis, narrows down to a question of policy. In
citing the Foster case as authority for its position, the dissent overlooks
the fact that the Foster case involved the workman's cause of action,
whereas the instant case, the widow's. The dissent also asserts that
since the first subsection of the statute determines the status for compensation at the time of the injury the same construcion should be placed
on the remaining subsections, including compensation to the widow In
the last paragraph of the dissent, it is admitted it is a question of policy.
In considering the policy side of the question, if the view expressed
in the majority is adopted the industry cannot foresee its probable liability The theory behind the Workmen's Compensation Acts is that Industry should bear the burden of injuries to labor, but how can industry
estimate and distribute the burden if the status of the parties at the
time of the injury does not determine their right to recovery as dependents? It is indeed a great hardship on industry to let workmen accumulate dependents after the time of their injury who will be in a position
to recover under the Workmen's Compensation Act at the time of the
workman's death.
C. C.

